The last few decades have seen a significant reduction in trade barriers, which has brought the international aspects of competition policies into greater prominence. In this paper we explore the effects of tariffs on the profitability and welfare consequences of mergers in a simple model of the integrated world market for a single homogeneous product in which firms differ in their levels of efficiency. We find that the tariff "protects" less efficient firms from closure through merger if they are import-competing, but makes such closure more likely if they are exporters. Thus a tariff is likely to generate mergers of exporting firms. The implications of the tariff for the global welfare consequences of mergers depend on the tariff's effects on total output. If the tariff reduces (increases) total output, mergers are less (more) likely to raise welfare.
I Introduction
The objective of this paper is to explore the effects of tariffs on the The success of international agreements constraining the ability of governments to use trade policies because of their undesirable beggar-thy-neighbour consequences, has raised concern that some governments may be tempted to substitute other policies, competition policy in particular, with similar outcomes (Lloyd and Sampson, 1995) . Should trade agreements be complemented by agreements on, or "harmonisation" of, competition policies, and what form should such agreements take (Lloyd, 1998) ? This concern prompted research investigating the links between competition policy and trade policy, where the latter is broadly defined to include import and export taxes and subsidies, and domestic production subsidies. Because this literature focuses on the welfare effects of mergers, the competition policy decision is typically modelled as the choice of the number of identical domestic firms for simplicity 2 .
1 See Horn and Levinsohn (1997) and WTO Annual Report 1997 for reviews of the literature investigating the links between trade policy and competition policy. 2 In the standard "cross-hauling" trade model, increasing the number of domestic firms is both importsubstituting and export-promoting (Bliss, 1996) , and competition policy choices are then influenced by the range of trade policy options available and the sequences in which policy decisions are made.
Where countries have symmetric exporting and import-competing interests in the same sector, Horn and Levinsohn (1997) show that there is no unambiguous answer to the question of whether increased foreign competition will lead governments to choose more or less domestic competition. They are able to rank the optimal numbers of firms for a variety of policy-constrained cases, and find that these rankings are broadly similar for tariff and export subsidy policies. A clearer picture emerges in less symmetric cases: for example the Brander-Spencer profit-shifting model (Rysman, 1999) or the interactions between the importing and the exporting governments in a single market (Cowan, 1989) .
Where the decision by firms to merge has been the focus of analysis, it is typically modelled as motivated either by fixed cost savings or variable cost rationalisation. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) have shown that identical Cournot-competing firms with constant marginal costs have no incentive to merge in a closed market, unless the participants collectively have a large share of the market pre-merger, or the merger saves on fixed costs 3 . But small tariffs are likely to have rather a limited impact where the incentive to merge is avoiding fixed costs 4 , and so the natural focus in this paper is on mergers motivated by rationalisation of production 5 . The simplest way to introduce inter-firm efficiency and size differences, is to suppose firms have different technologies, reflected in different (constant) marginal costs. In this context, Lahiri and Ono (1988) have shown that the exit of the most inefficient firm can be welfare improving. A merger with a more efficient firm is one mechanism through which this might occur, as long as the merger is also profitable to the participants. Head and Ries (1997) for example, use this model to investigate the potential conflicts that arise between national competition authorities if the effects of mergers spill over national borders 6 .
In most of this literature, only a few of the potential mergers are considered, and they tend to be chosen exogenously. More recently some consideration has been devoted to examining the full constellation of merger possibilities, in order to predict which mergers are likely to be proposed in which circumstances. Horn and Persson (2001) have established some general results on "endogenous mergers" under both Richardson (1999) considers the advantages of harmonisation of competition policies, where different governments place different weights on the welfare of their producers and consumers in computing national welfare. 3 This analysis has been extended to non-Cournot behaviour and non-linear demand. See, for example, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) , Kwoka (1989) and Fauli-Oller (1997) . If a merger is proposed it can be assumed to be profitable to its participants, and so Farrell and Shapiro (1990) focus on its effects on non-participants ("external effects"). Their work has been extended to a multicountry context by Barros and Cabral (1994) , who derive conditions on the output shares of participants and non-participants sufficient for the external effects of the merger to be positive. 4 Gaudet and Kanomi (2000) consider the incentive that different levels of the tariff provide for a fixedcost saving domestic merger. The main impact arises when the tariff is large enough to influence the number of foreign competitors in the market. 5 Perry and Porter (1985) introduce an explicit link between marginal cost and firm size through a tangible asset, assumed to be in fixed supply to the industry, whose quantity in the hands of a firm determines its unit costs. Then the merged firm has more of the asset and therefore lower costs. This approach has also been extended to a multi-country context. See Horn and Levinsohn (1997) for example. Kabiraj and Chaudhuri (1999) compare the relative profitability and welfare effects of national and cross-border mergers, and show that there exists a range of merger efficiency gains for which a cross-border merger would lead to higher domestic welfare than a national merger. 6 They consider both fixed cost saving and variable cost rationalision motivations for mergers and relate the potential conflicts to the international distribution of consumption and ownership of firms.
fixed cost saving and variable cost rationalisation motives. We draw on the latter below.
Investigation of the effects of trade policy on mergers motivated by variable cost rationalisation are relatively scarce. Long and Vousden (1995) consider the effects of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalisation on the incentives for an exogenously chosen merger in a world composed of two countries with symmetric segmented markets. They characterise potential mergers in terms of the differences in the pre-merger marginal costs of the participants. For any given tariff only a range of cost differences generate profitable mergers, and this range shifts with changes in the tariff. They find that a unilateral tariff reduction will increase the profitability of mergers with small cost differences (mergers which "primarily concentrate on market power" in their terms). In contrast bilateral tariff cuts will increase the profitability of mergers with larger cost differences (mergers which "primarily reduce costs"). Horn and Persson (1999) consider equilibrium ownership structures in a model where international mergers can avoid trade costs. They assume two identical countries with segmented markets, each with two identical owners of an asset in fixed supply that can be used to produce a homogeneous good. They then show that international (rather than domestic) mergers are more likely when trade costs are low, and that this result holds when mergers generate either fixed cost savings or variable cost synergies.
This paper extends these results by considering the implications of tariffs for both the profitability and global welfare consequences of endogenous mergers, in an integrated international market, where countries and firms are not necessarily identical. We employ a simple model of the market for a single homogeneous product, in which firms are Cournot competitors and differ in their levels of efficiency. Demand is linear and firms have constant marginal costs. This structure allows for relatively simple solutions, where the effects of discrete changes in the number of firms (mergers) on profits and welfare can be considered. The impact of a small tariff change on these effects can then be derived. Horn and Persson (2001) discuss the relative merits of the various approaches to endogenising mergers. Here we adapt the approach of Barros (1998) 
where j jN Cc ∈ = ∑ , and n is the number and N the set of producing firms.
When two firms in this market (k and j) "merge", they become a single decision making unit. Given that the merger itself is has no effect on the technology of the participants, cost minimisation by the new merged firm implies the abandonment of firm k's (relatively inefficient) technology, and the new market equilibrium is simply that which obtains with the closure of firm k 12 . Total output falls, the market price rises, the profits of the remaining firms rise and consumer surplus falls 13 . Consumers lose from the merger, and non-participating producers gain. The incentive to merge is the additional profits that may accrue to the merged firm as a result of the higher price. The shift to the new post-merger equilibrium (where y ∆ denotes the change in variable y as a consequence of the merger) has ; ,; 633
The closure of firm k results in an increase in the output of each of the remaining firms. Given our assumptions of linearity and constant marginal costs, their outputs rise by the same absolute amount, which is one third of the closing firm's original output. Since only 2 firms remain, total output falls (by 3 k x ), and price rises (by
The change in profits of continuing firm h is the increased profits on its original output plus the profits from its increased output. This can be rearranged into three terms -a transfer from consumers, who are paying a higher price for the firm's output, a transfer of profits from the closing firm, and the increased profit resulting from the greater efficiency of this firm relative to the closing firm. Only the last term represents a social gain. Substituting from (4)
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This merger will have been profitable for the participants only if the increase in profits to firm j exceed the lost profits of the closed firm. Substituting from (5), this
Equation (6) provides a condition on relative firm sizes (or relative shares of output)
for a profitable merger. Given k x , and the number of firms, the larger the initial output of the continuing partner the more likely the merger is to yield a net gain.
In his analysis of endogenous mergers in this type of market, Barros (1998) notes that there are two general conditions that the distribution of profits of the merged firm must satisfy in equilibrium. First, there are participation constraints that patentable, the existing firms held all the patents and there was little prospect of any firm inventing a viable new technology. 13 Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provide the conditions for output to fall under more general assumptions. 
that is the payoffs to each partner be no less than the maximum offer that the outside firm h would be willing to make for their participation in the alternative merger 14 .
We can now use these constraints to determine the conditions under which different mergers may occur. With three firms there are, in principle, three possible mergers. But since 132313 2 π π π >=, it is always more profitable for the smallest firm to combine with the largest firm rather than with the intermediate firm 15 , and the intermediate firm would always prefer the {1,3} merger. Hence the potential mergers are {1,3} and {1,2} -i.e. firms 2 and 3 are "bidding" over a possible merger with 1.
When both mergers are profitable, we follow Barros in assuming the one with the largest internal gain (taking account of the gains from being an outside firm) will occur. Thus merger {1,2}, ({1,3}) occurs if
This ranking corresponds to that based on outside offers, since the maximum outside offer each of the smaller firms will make to 1 are, respectively 14 Note that the stability condition uses
reflecting that the outside firm is always better off from a merger. 
there will be cases where firm 3 makes the larger outside offer to 1, even though merger {1,3} is not the most profitable (i.e.
The profitability conditions can be obtained from equation (6) Corresponding to each of these cases will be a distribution of the profits of any merged firm between the partners (i.e. specific values of jk j π etc). This distribution should reflect the outside opportunities of the partners, but is otherwise indeterminate.
These outcomes are illustrated in Figure 1a . Given the size of the largest firm while if firm 1 is much larger than the others (region 3b) both mergers will be profitable, but merger {1,2} will be proposed.
Welfare Effects: Total benefits ( W % ) from this market are the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and total profits (Π) 2*2 2 1 222
The change in consumer surplus in any country as a consequence of the merger has two components, both negative. There is a transfer from consumers to firms as a result of the price rise, and a consumption deadweight loss. In examining the welfare effects of mergers it is useful to express equilibrium demands as functions of total output ( X ). From (1') we have that 
and is negative since each merger results in a reduction in total output. The larger the output of the closing firm the larger the consumer surplus loss.
A positive gain to the merging firms is sufficient for total profits to rise since the outside firm's profits always increase. The overall change in profits has three components. There is the transfer from consumers, who are paying a higher price, and an efficiency gain from redistributing output to lower cost firms. Both of these are positive. But there is also the lost profit on the discontinued output.
The change in total welfare then reflects the balance between the consumption deadweight loss and the lost profits on the one hand and the efficiency gain on the other. Thus for merger {1,3} we find, using (12), (15) and (6) 
we conclude that merger {1,2} will yield a higher welfare change than merger {1,3} if the most efficient firm is sufficiently large (i.e. 1 1925 xX > ), in which case both mergers are welfare improving.
These outcomes are illustrated in Figure 1b . No merger would be approved in area A. In area B, merger {1,3} would be approved 17 , but {1,2] would not be. In area Ca either merger would be welfare improving, but merger {1,3} would give the greater welfare improvement 18 . In area Cb, either merger is welfare improving, but merger {1,2} yields the larger welfare gain.
The conditions for a global welfare improvement can be combined with the conditions for merger profitability and stability to derive the circumstances under which mergers will be proposed and approved. We assume, as seems reasonable, that a proposal is a precondition for approval, and that the competition authority is not in a position to "force" mergers. 
III Tariffs and Mergers
The aim of this Section is to investigate the effects of tariffs on the incentives for and welfare consequences of the mergers considered above. We now construct the market equilibrium assuming a small specific tariff of t per unit is imposed by the home country, which we assume will continue to be an importer after any mergers. We continue to deal with an integrated world market, where there are no transport costs and costless arbitrage between markets is possible. Arbitrage activities will occur if the deviation in prices in the two markets ever exceeds the relevant tariff (i.e. if p > p*+t, or p* > p). A tariff will therefore affect the equilibrium in both markets 21 .
The determination of the market equilibrium is modelled as a two-stage game.
In the first stage, firms determine their sales in each market, taking each others' sales as given. In the second stage, arbitrage activity occurs if the first stage decisions generate a price differential between the two markets that exceeds the relevant tariff. . 21 Our assumptions of linear demand and a specific tariff considerably simplify the analysis that follows. Collie (1998) shows that a specific or ad valorem tariff has an (indirect ) demand induced rationalisation effect on production as it moves the industry up its demand curve thereby making demand flatter (steeper) if demand is concave (convex). This affects both domestic and foreign firms, with output of the jth firm increasing by more than the average if demand is concave (convex) and it is larger (smaller) than average. Ad valorem tariffs also have a direct rationalisation effect by making the foreign firms' perceived demand curves flatter. This does not affect domestic firms. 
In the first stage, the jth home firm's optimisation problem, taking account of the possibility of arbitrage activity in the second stage, is: 
As long as the tariff is below that which eliminates arbitrage we have:
, the solution to (17) x hfxpc π +==−= Thus profit maximisation yields an equilibrium which has home firms selling only in the home market, while foreign firms are indifferent as to where they sell (in the absence of transport costs).
In addition to changing total outputs, the tariff also shifts the distribution of any given output between demands in the two markets. In place of (11) 
The tariff tends to reduce consumption in the tariff-imposing country and raise it in the exporting country.
The implications of the tariff for equilibrium prices and mergers will depend on where firms are located. To illustrate the possibilities we consider four alternative allocations of firms between countries, each of which is consistent with the home country being an net importer both in free trade and after any merger.
[A] All firms are located in the exporting country.
In this case there are no domestic firms to protect, but the tariff could be imposed for revenue-raising or terms of trade reasons. The equilibrium prices under the tariff are given by 78 ppt =+ and * 8 ppt =− , where p is the "free trade" price determined above. In the absence of a domestic supply, the main impact of the tariff is to raise the price in the importing country. The output of firm j is given by The implications of the tariff for proposed mergers then follow directly -i.e.
(1) no merger is proposed if 13 60.58 xtx +≤ ; (2) Since firms' outputs are reduced in the same amount by the tariff, the accompanying fall in profits is proportionately larger the smaller is the firm. This increases the likelihood that either merger will be profitable, and therefore that some merger will be proposed (as shown by (1)). These changes in relative outputs imply corresponding changes in relative outside offers when both mergers are profitable, that make merger {1,2} more likely to be preferred at the margin, as shown by case (3). Although the profits of merged firm {1,2} fall by more than the profits of merged firm {1,3}, the profits of outside firm 2 from merger {1,3} also falls by more than the profits of outside firm 3 from merger {1,2}. The net result of these changes is that 2 become relatively more interested in participating in a merger. These outcomes are illustrated by the shifts of the boundary lines in Figure 2a . The no merger area (1) contracts. The areas where{1,3} is profitable (2+3a+3b) and where {1,2} is profitable (3a+3b) both expand. But the areas where {1,3} is proposed (2 and 3a) contracts, while the areas where {1,2} is proposed (3b) expands.
Thus when the tariff-imposing country is a "pure" importer (i.e. has no domestic industry), the imposition of the tariff makes it more likely that there will be some merger between exporting firms, thereby reducing the supply of imports. It also makes it more likely that this merger will involve the two largest exporting firms, thereby giving a larger merger-induced reduction in the supply of imports.
When we consider the effects of mergers on global welfare in this tariff distorted world economy, we must take into account that the tariff has distributional (shown by (18)) and revenue implications, in addition to its effects on outputs. Now total welfare is 2*2
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Here the first two terms represent home welfare (home consumer surplus plus tariff revenue), while the remaining terms give foreign welfare (foreign consumer surplus plus all the profits). As before, a merger reduces consumer surplus in both countries, but increases aggregate profits. Now it also reduces tariff revenue 23 . Proceeding as before we find 23 One can show that the loss due to the fall in tariff revenue more than exceeds the "benefit" that the tariff has given by reducing the consumer surplus loss from the merger.
[] {2} 4
The direct effect of the tariff (i.e. other than through its indirect effects on outputs, and hence also profits) is to increase the absolute value of the first (negative) term.
To proceed further we need to consider specific mergers. Under merger {1,3}, equation (19) becomes 3 3 (1,3)[6256] 36
Before we can compare this with (13), we need to take into account the influence of the tariff on outputs, which gives reduces the market share of the smallest firm, which would tend to render this merger more likely to be welfare improving. However, the direct effects of the tariff on aggregate welfare (through redistributing demand and generating revenue) lead to additional adverse welfare effects of the merger (as shown in (20)), and these latter consequences dominate in the aggregate.
Similarly for merger {1,2}, whose welfare implications follow analogously.
Thus both mergers are less likely to be approved in general under the tariff.
Comparing their relative welfare effects, we find that These outcomes are shown in Figure 2b . Area A, where neither merger would raise welfare is larger under the tariff. The areas where merger {1,3} would raise welfare (B+Ca+Cb) and the areas where merger {1,2}would raise welfare ( Ca+Cb) both contract as a result of the tariff. However if both mergers are welfare improving the likelihood that {1,2} is preferred is increased (area Cb expands).
[B] The smallest firm is located in the importing country.
An issue of interest here is whether the tariff "protects" domestic output, not only in the sense of raising the domestic firm's output (and profits) when it operates, but also in the sense of making it less likely to be "merged" with a foreign firm. Equilibrium prices under the tariff are given by 58 ppt =+ and * 38 ppt =− , and outputs for the home and foreign firms respectively, by 33 54 hxt =+ and 34
The home firm's output (and profits) rise as a result of the tariff, the foreign firms' outputs (and profits) fall.
The implications of the tariff for proposed mergers are again straightforward:
(1) no merger is proposed if 13 614.58 xtx −≤ ;
(2) merger {1,3}is the only profitable merger if 312 8614.5816 xxtxt <−<−; The likelihood that some merger is proposed falls (area 1 expands in Figure 3a) , and we now have the possibility that merger {1,2} is profitable while merger {1,3} is not (the shaded area) 25 . The likelihood that merger {1,3} alone is profitable contracts (case (2)), while the likelihood that both mergers are profitable expands (case (3)). An interesting feature is that the likelihood that merger {1,3} is preferred when both mergers are profitable (case (3a)) has increased. Both merged firms have lower profits, and the gain to outside firm 2 from merger {1,3} falls, while the gain to outside firm 3 from merger {1,2} rises. This would tend to suggest that firm 3 would become relatively less interested in a merger, however the fall in profits to merged 24 In order to keep all firms producing in the absence of the merger, we assume that 43 2 tx < . We also assume that 31 tcc <− (or equivalently that 31 txx <− ), so that, if merger {1,3] occurs, the merged firm does not face a "tariff-jumping" incentive to continue production using firm 3's technology for the home market. 25 If the tariff has made firm 3 larger than firm 2 and 868 213 xxh <<. This requires that all outputs are quite similar in free trade, so that 861.5816 213 xxtxt <−<+ .
firm {1,2} is sufficiently large that firm 3 makes a relatively stronger offer at the margin.
Does the tariff "protect" the domestic output from disappearing in a merger?
The answer may well be negative. While the likelihood of merger {1,3} is reduced at the margin where it is the only profitable merger, it is increased at the margin where both are profitable (i.e. in Figure 3a , 2 contracts but 3a expands).
The welfare effects of mergers in this case follow fairly directly from [ 
We observe that the direct effect of the tariff is positive in this case, because of the boost this merger gives to tariff revenue. However, once we take into account the influence of the tariff on outputs, we find 3 3 11 (1,3) [625] 364
Overall, the indirect effects of the tariff in increasing the market share of the smallest firm dominate the direct effects, and, as in the previous case, the tariff makes this merger less likely to be welfare improving.
The alternative merger will raise domestic production and hence have a negative impact on tariff revenue. The change in global welfare is given by 2 2
(1,2)[62518] 36
x WXxt ∆=−− % the direct effect of the tariff is negative. Once we take into account its indirect effects through the outputs (reducing the pre-merger share of firm 2 in particular), we find This case is very similar to [B] , with firm 2 behind the tariff wall rather than firm 3.
Equilibrium prices are as in [B] , with firm 2's output increasing. The implications of for proposed mergers are:
(1) no merger is proposed if 13 61.58 xtx +≤;
( 2) Considering profitability alone, the area where merger {1,3} is profitable expands, while the area where merger {1,2} is profitable contracts. The merger between the two exporting firms is more likely under the tariff (2+3a expands in figure 4a ), while the merger involving the import-competing firm is less likely (3b contracts).
The welfare effects of mergers also follow fairly directly from [B] . Merger {1,3} will expand domestic production and hence reduce tariff revenue. The change in global welfare is 3 3
(1,3)[62518] 36
x WXxt ∆=−− % and the tariff has a negative direct effect. This is reduced, but not reversed, once we take into account the influence of the tariff on outputs [D] Only the largest firm is exporting.
The issue of interest here is the effects of the tariff on the relative "protection" given to the two firms located in the tariff-imposing country. The outputs of both domestic firms are increased in the same amount by the tariff.
This reduces the profitability of both mergers at the margin (cases (1) and (3)), making the likelihood that some merger is proposed lower (area 1 expands in Figure   5a ). Moreover, the likelihood that {1,2} is the preferred merger (area 3b) falls. This time the tariff reduces the profits of both merged firms, and increases the gains from being the outsider to both firms 2 and 3. But the fall in profits is larger for merged firm {1,2} and the gain from being the outsider increases more for firm 2. Thus firm 2 is relatively less interested in participating in a merger. Because of this effect, we can conclude that while a merger is less likely, the likelihood that merger {1,3} is proposed may rise or fall as a result of the tariff (areas 2+3a may expand or contract in Figure 5a ).
The global welfare effects of mergers require only slight modification to previous cases. Now Compared with free trade, merger {1,2} is less likely to give a larger welfare gain (area Cb contracts) Hence we conclude that merger {1,3} is more likely to be preferred. 26 Note that in this case the tariff raises world output. Again we assume that 21 txx <− , so that either merger sees the domestic partner cease production.
The relevant features of the results for all of these cases are presented in Table 1 and are summarised in the next section.
IV Conclusions
This paper set out to investigate the implications of tariffs for endogenous mergers in an integrated world economy. A simple partial equilibrium model of Cournot oligopolists with different technologies was used to illustrate issues.
Conditions for each merger to be profitable to participants and stable to offers from the outside firm were derived in the free trade equilibrium. Conditions under which a global competition authority would approve each merger, and when it would prefer one merger over the another, were also derived for this case.
The model was then extended to include a tariff. If one (the importing) country had a small tariff in place, its firms found it profitable to sell only in their home market, and the firms in the other (exporting) country received the same (net) price wherever they sold. We then looked at the effects of the tariff on merger proposals and approvals in four cases, which captured the range of possible outcomes in this model. The tariff introduces a further distortion into an already distorted (by imperfect competition) market, and introduced a revenue term into the welfare calculations.
While the influence of the tariff on merger proposals could be determined straightforwardly from its influence on firm outputs, the tariff had additional (direct) affects on the welfare consequences of any merger.
Are mergers more likely to occur in the tariff-distorted global economy? This depends on where the least efficient firm is located. A merger is less likely if this firm is protected by the tariff, and more likely if it is not. So, at this margin, the tariff "protects" an inefficient import-competing firm, both in terms of increasing its output while producing and of reducing the likelihood that it will close down through merger (the profits of the owners are increased in each case of course). Conversely the tariff "harms" an inefficient exporting firm by reducing its output when producing and raising the probability that it will close down through merger.
How does the tariff affect which merger is likely to be proposed? From the Table we see that the answer depends on whether the tariff has a "protective" role.
Merger {1,2} is less likely to be proposed as long as at least one firm is located in the protected market, and in these circumstances there is a (weak) presumption that merger {1,3} is more likely to be proposed. The opposite is true when all firms are exporting.
How is a global competition authority likely to respond? Considering mergers individually, the competition authority is less likely to approve either merger under the tariff, unless there is more than one import-competing firm. This reflects the direct effects of the distortion created by the tariff. The tariff reduces total output in all cases except where the majority of firms are behind the tariff wall, and in that case the expansion of total output comes at the expense of the output of the most efficient firm.
Considering mergers together, there is a (weak) presumption that the merger that closes the least efficient firm is more likely to be preferred if that firm is protected by the tariff, and less likely to be preferred otherwise. The merger that closes the intermediate firm is less likely to be preferred where the least efficient firm is protected, and more likely to be preferred otherwise.
While this tells us the impact of the merger on global welfare, it is important to note that in practice merger (dis )approvals are determined by national competition authorities and not by a global authority. It is reasonable to expect that national authorities will be primarily concerned with the effects of any proposed merger on national welfare. A merger that raises global welfare must improve the national welfare of at least one of the two countries, but not necessarily both. The distribution of national welfare depends on the distribution of demand, the location of firm ownership and the distribution of the gains from mergers between the merging parties.
These are topics for future investigation. . 
